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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's appellate decision that reversed 
the magistrate court's order denying Corey Thiel's motion for immediate release 
from custody. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
In December 2011, the state charged Thiel with felony domestic battery. 
(Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case No. CR-2011-20485.) Pursuant to an 
agreement with the state, Thiel ultimately pied guilty to an amended charge of 
misdemeanor domestic battery and was placed on supervised probation. (Id.) 
Approximately one week later, the state charged Thiel with misdemeanor 
violation of a no-contact order for an incident which occurred while the domestic 
battery charge was pending. (R., pp.7-8.) Thiel pied guilty to violating the no-
contact order, and the magistrate court imposed credit for time served, 
suspended jail time, and two years unsupervised probation. (R., pp.22-25.) 
Under the terms of probation, Thiel was required to comply with the terms of 
supervised probation in his domestic battery case. (Id.) 
Approximately two months later, the state filed a motion for probation 
violation in Theil's no-contact order violation case. (R., pp.31-32.) Thiel admitted 
violating his probation by missing meetings with his probation officer, failing to 
appear for drug testing, and providing a diluted drug test. (See R., p.74.) The 
district court reinstated Thiel on probation. (R., pp.38-39). Approximately four 
months after that, the state filed a second motion for probation violation, alleging 
1 
Thiel failed to maintain contact with his probation officer and failed to provide 
documentation that he completed required domestic violence treatment. (R., 
pp.44-45.) Thiel admitted the violation, and the district court revoked Thiel's 
probation and imposed his original sentence, which included 289 days remaining 
to serve. (R., p.53.) 
In October 2013, the Ada County Sheriff wrote the magistrate court and 
recommended that Thiel be granted an early release from jail. 1 (R., p.93.) The 
Sheriff cited I.C. § 20-621 and stated that "[w]hile an inmate in the Ada County 
Jail, [Thiel] had a good record and performed all assigned tasks in an orderly and 
peaceable manner." (Id.) Thiel also separately moved for "immediate release," 
citing the Sheriff's letter. (R., pp.80-82.) The magistrate court denied both the 
Sheriff's request and Thiel's motion. (R., p.83. 93.) Upon Thiel's proposed 
release order, the magistrate court wrote, "I will not sign an order releasing an 
untreated, violent offender into the community. The Ada County Sheriff, if he 
believes he has the authority to do so, may release regardless of my ... concerns 
for safety." (R., p.83.) Thiel appealed the magistrate court's order denying his 
motion for release from jail to the district court. (R., pp.84-86.) 
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court held that the 
magistrate court erred in denying Thiel's motion for release from custody. (R., 
pp.119-126.) Specifically, the district court concluded that where a county sheriff 
1 At the time the Sheriff sent this letter, it appears Thiel had already completed 
the sentence in his domestic battery case, but still had time to serve on his 
sentence in the no-contact order violation case. (See R., p.53; Idaho Data 
Repository, Ada County Case No. CR-2011-20485.) 
2 
recommends an inmate release pursuant to I.C. § 20-621, the magistrate court is 
required to release the inmate. (Id.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.127-130.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in reversing the magistrate court's order denying 
Thiel's motion for release from jail? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Reversing The Magistrate Court's Order Denying 
Thiel's Motion For Release From Jail 
A. Introduction 
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court held that where a 
county sheriff recommends an inmate's release pursuant to I.C. § 20-621, the 
magistrate court's acceptance of the recommendation is mandatory. (R., pp.119-
126.) The district court erred because I.C. § 20-621 is ambiguous as to the 
respective roles and duties of the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-
time early inmate release process, and an application of the rules of statutory 
construction reveals that the legislature did not intend to give county sheriffs 
unbridled authority to release inmates. The district court therefore erred in 
reversing the magistrate court's order denying Theil's motion for immediate 
release. 
In the alternative, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 does provide county sheriffs 
the authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute violates 
the Idaho Constitution because it deprives the judicial branch of its power to 
sentence offenders. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The meaning and effect of a statute, including the statute's 
constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). "The party 
attacking a statute on constitutional grounds must overcome a strong 
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presumption of validity." State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 430, 179 P.3d 1084, 
1086 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 
131 (2003)). "Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality." 19.:. 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The appellate 
court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial 
and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether 
the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." 19.:. "If those 
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district 
court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district 
court's decision as a matter of procedure." 19.:. (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 
183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)). 
C. Idaho Code § 20-621 Does Not Require A Magistrate Court To Grant A 
County Sheriff's Inmate Release Request 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy. 128 Idaho 362,365, 913 P.2d 
578, 581 (1996). "When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in 
accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing 
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court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted). 
When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended it to mean. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009). To determine that intent, the appellate court examines not only the 
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of the proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. !!!:. 
In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute "effect must give given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006). 
Idaho Code§ 20-621 reads: 
Every person serving a jail sentence in a county jail in the 
state of Idaho who has a good record as a prisoner and who 
performs the tasks assigned him in an orderly and peaceable 
manner, shall upon the recommendation of the sheriff be allowed 
five (5) days off of each and every month of his sentence, by the 
magistrate judge. 
Idaho Code§ 20-621 is ambiguous as to the respective roles and duties of 
the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-time early inmate release 
process. While the statute identifies the sheriff and magistrate judge as 
participants in this process, and sets forth criteria for an inmate's early release, 
the statute does not identify the scope or existence of judicial review, nor does it 
expressly provide that such judicial review is precluded. However, a closer 
review of the language utilized in the statute, and a consideration of relevant 
public policy concerns, reveals that the legislature did not intend to grant county 
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sheriffs the authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates based upon 
their own unreviewable finding of compliance with the statutory criteria. 
First, the statute tellingly sets the good-time early inmate release process 
in motion "upon the recommendation" of a county sheriff. (Emphasis added.) 
The term "recommendation" indicates a suggestion which may or may not be 
followed, rather than a mandatory directive. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 
(1990), defines "recommendation" as an "action which is advisory in nature 
rather than one having any binding effect." Thus, while I.C. § 20-621 provides 
county sheriffs the authority to recommend early inmate release under some 
circumstances, such an action does not bind the magistrate court. 
Further, rather than expressly and directly requiring the magistrate court to 
follow such a "recommendation" of a county sheriff, the statute merely provides 
that an inmate receiving such a recommendation "[s]hall ... be allowed" early 
release "by the magistrate judge." I.C. § 20-621 (emphasis added). Again, the 
phrase "be allowed" indicates permission or eligibility for release subject to 
judicial review, not a mandatory directive. If the legislature intended to provide a 
county sheriff the authority to direct the magistrate court to release inmates, it 
would have utilized the term "shall" in terms of the release itself, i.e., "shall 
release," or "shall follow the recommendation for release." Instead, pursuant to 
I.C. § 20-621, an inmate "shall" merely be "allowed" an early release under 
certain conditions, including, implicitly, judicial review of the sheriff's 
recommendation. See also Dictionary.com (Accessed June 12, 2014) (defining 
"allowed" as "to give permission to or for; permit"). 
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Policy considerations further support the state's interpretation of the 
statute. Under the interpretation set forth by Thiel and the district court, there is 
no oversight or review of a sherrif's determination that an inmate has complied 
with the requirements of I.C. § 20-621. In his letter "recommending" Thiel's 
release, the Ada County Sheriff quoted relevant language from I.C. § 20-621, but 
provided no actual documentation or support for his conclsuory statement that 
Thiel complied with the statute's requirements. Indeed, under the district court's 
interpretation of the statute, no support or explanation is required, because no 
judicial review is permitted. Such an interpretation shields an important 
consideration - whether to release an individual convicted of a crime from 
custody prior to the completion of his lawfully-imposed sentence - from both 
judicial review, and from any potential challenge from prosecutors, who would 
have no opportunity to contest whether the criteria of I.C. § 20-621 had been met. 
The district court's interpretation of the statute also endangers certain 
rights held by Idaho crime victims. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e), a crime 
victim has the right to be heard, upon their request, at all criminal justice 
proceedings, specifically including those where a criminal defendant's "release 
from custody" is considered. Such a right would be meaningless if a magistrate 
court has no authority other than to follow the mandatory directive of a county 
sheriff to release an inmate. 
Finally, as discussed in greater detail below, the district court's 
interpretation of I.C. § 20-621 would render it unconstitutional. Generally 
speaking, "it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which 
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will not render it a nullity." Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 108 
Idaho 147,151,697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). Thus, where a statute is ambiguous, 
a court may presume that the legislature did not intend an interpretation of the 
statute which would render it unconstitutional. 
Idaho Code § 20-621 is ambiguous because it does not describe the 
respective roles and duties of the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-
time early inmate release process. Application of the tools of statutory 
construction, and a consideration of the relevant public policy concerns, reveals 
that the legislature did not intend to provide county sheriffs unbridled authority to 
direct magistrate courts to release inmates. Therefore, the district court erred in 
reversing the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion for release from 
custody. 
D. In The Alternative, To The Extent I.C. § 20-621 Provides County Sheriffs 
The Authority To Direct Magistrate Courts To Release Inmates, The Statute 
Violates The Idaho Constitution 
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution distributes power to the three 
distinct departments of government, and provides that "no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Article V, § 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution specifically prohibits the legislature from "depriv[ing] the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it." 
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Therefore, the legislature may not divest authority from the magistrate court 
unless expressly provided for in the Idaho constitution. 2 
Among the inherent powers of the judiciary is the power to control and 
prevent abuse of a court order, such as a judgment of conviction and sentencing 
determination, Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 227, 232, 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964), 
and the power to exercise discretion in sentencing, State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 
240,486 P.2d 247,251 (1971); see also State v. Easley. 156 Idaho 214, 302-303, 
322 P.3d 296, _ (2014) (holding that the Idaho Fifth Judicial District's practice 
of granting prosecutors an "absolute veto" over the post-judgment court's ability 
to sentence a defendant to mental health court violated the Idaho Constitution's 
Separation of Powers doctrine). Consistent with this inherent authority, the Idaho 
Criminal Rules further provide courts specific authority to reduce sentences in 
some circumstances. See I.C.R. 35. 
In this case, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 provides county sheriffs the 
authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute divests 
sentencing authority from the judiciary, and effectively gives sheriffs the authority 
to modify judgments of conviction. Because the Idaho Constitution does not 
expressly direct or permit this type of divestiture of power, such an interpretation 
of I.C. § 20-621 renders it constitutionally invalid. The district court therefore 
erred in reversing the magistrate court's order that denied Thiel's motion for 
release from custody. 
2 Article IV, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution grants the Idaho legislature the power to 
prescribe procedures governing applications for clemency through a board of 
pardons, but provides that "no commutation" of sentences may be granted 
except by compliance with the procedures described in that section. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court's 
appellate decision, reinstate the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion 
for release from custody, and to remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 2014. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2014, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Dylan Orton 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON' 
Deputy Attorney General 
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